The Presumption of Survivorship by Chapman, Francis
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly. Except July, August and September. by the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School, at 236 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., and
34th and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.
VOLUME 62 JUNE, 1914. NUMBER 8
THE PRESUMPTION OF SURVIVORSHIP.
The writer disclaims any responsibility for his topic. It
was chosen for him and has presented as great difficulties in writ-
ing an article, as would be in the way of a lecturer speaking on
snakes in Ireland. Tradition credits Saint Patrick with destroy-
ing or driving out the snakes so that there are none in the Green
Isle. In the same fashion judges, English and American, have
destroyed the idea of a presumption of survivorship, in our juris-
prudence. In doing this they have run counter to the views of
continental jurists, and in some cases our own jurists while en-
forcing the so-called common law rule have yearned for the flexi-
bility or at least the *certainty of the civil law.
A presumption in the old sense of the word is merely a
logical inference, usually from circumstantial evidence, or it may
be regarded as a fixed rule of law.
Presumptions may be classified as prima facie, conclusive and
spurious. Absence for seven years with a total lack of communi-
cation with those with whom the absent person would naturally
have communicated if alive, is prima facie evidence of the death
of the one so absent. The presumption of the immemorial exist-
ence and legal origin of a custom, right or easement enjoyed
during living memory is an example of a conclusive presump-
tion. A spurious presumption says McKelvey' is one which has
§38.
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nothing to do with evidence and among spurious presumptions
he places the so-called presumption of survivorship.
Where the facts as to the death of a person are fixed and
certain, there is no room for any presumption. It is only in
those cases in which there is a doubt or dispute as to the facts
that a presumption can be applied in any event.
The question of survivorship is one which can only arise in
connection with the devolution or descent of prope.rty, real or
personal, and only in those cases where its course would be
changed by the fact that one person outlived another. It is
usually in connection with some such event as the sinking of
the Titanic or a Conemaugh flood that the question most clearly
arises. The terms "common disaster, .... same accident," "com-
mon calamity," "same catastrophe," and similar terms -are used
to indicate the event which has ended the lives of two or more
persons and made it necessary to determine which if any sur-
vived. The terms are broad enough to include anything from
death in battle or by murder, to death in flood, fire or shipwreck.
When as is often the case, the ownership of a vast fortune turns
on the solution'of the problem it is at least interesting to specu-
late as to the crucial fact, but the way in which it will be re-
solved will depend on the jurisdiction in which, and the code
by which it is to be adjudged.
"By the Roman law. if a father and son perished in the same
shipwreck or battle and the son was under the age of puberty
it was presumed that he died first but if above that age, that he
was the survivor, upon the principle that, in the former case, the
elder is generally the more robust, and in the latter the younger." 2
The civilians taking the Roman law as a basis, built up a
set of arbitrary rules or presumptions of fact as to survivor-
ship in common disaster which "are more apt to hit the truth
than others, because they are based on attributes of age and'sex
which fix the average strength of individuals, and their ability
to prolong their lives in shipwrecks or other disasters in which
strength may be useful to live." 3
2Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 At. Rep. 64 (1891).
'Supreme Council v. Kacer, 96 Mo. App. 93; 69 S. W. Rep. 671 (19o2).
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These arbitrary rules were by the civilians put in the form
of five or more proposals or rules for the guidance of the
courts: 4
I. To admit a presumption derived from the difference
either of sex or age or bodily strength or from pro-
pinquity to the place in which the cause of death arose.
:2. To admit in all cases the presumption founded on order
of nature elder before younger.
3. To admit the latter only where the deceased were of
same sex, age or were of age of puberty.
4. Not to admit any presumption when the right of him to
succeed depended on predecease of one in whom estate
vested and survivorship of him on whom devolved and
through whom it was claimed.
5- Presume both died at same time and admit heirs of both
to share in property.
As illustrations of the way in which the civilians decided
these cases, we findthat in 1572 the Parliament of Paris deal-
ing with survivorship in the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, de-
cided that parents would be slain before their children because
the slayers would regard them as the more dangerous.5
In 1629 a mother and her daughter, aged four years, were
drowned in the Loire, the Parliament of Paris held that it would
be presumed that a child of such tender years died first.
In 1658 a father and son were slain in the battle of the
Dunes and on the same day the daughter became a nun and
therefore civilly dead at the same hour the battle began. The
court held that the son should be decided to have survived.6
Again a father and two sons, one over and the other under
the age of puberty, lost their lives in a common disaster, the
civil law relying on its arbitrary rules held that they died in the
following order-(I) the son under the age of puberty (2) the
father (3) the son over the age of puberty.
'4 Burge Comm. on Colonial and Foreign Laws, r I.
'Stryk. Diss. io C. 6, n. ii.
'Fodere, Vol. 2, 220.
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In another case where a mother and son were hanged at the
same time, on the same gallows, the son was presumed to have
survived because of difference in age and sex.
7
These illustrations prove that the civilians did consider age,
sex, average strength, ability to prolong one's life in disaster and
even in cases of homicide the mental operations of the slayers.
When Napoleon I promulgated that remarkable code which
bears his name, in whose preparation he took a very consider-
able part, and for which he is entitled to much greater credit
than is commonly given him, there was written into it three
articles which have settled the law of survivorship for all time
in all countries in which the civil law or the Napoleonic Code is
the recognized standard. The articles from the Code Napoleon
are as follows:
If several persons respectively called to the succession of
each other, perish by one and the same accident, so that it is not
possible to ascertain which of them died first, the presumption
of survivorship is determined by the circumstances of the event
and in defect of such by force of age and sex."
If those who perished together were under fifteen years
the eldest shall be presumed to have survived. If they were all
above sixty the youngest shall be presumed to have survived.
If some were under fifteen years and others more than sixty,
the former shall be presumed to have survived.9
If those who perished together were of the age of fifteen
years complete but less than sixty the male is always presumed
to have survived where there is equality of age or if the differ-
ence does not exceed one year. If they were of the same sex
the presumption of survivorship which gives rise to succession
according to the order of nature must be admitted; thus the
younger is presumed to have survived the elder.1'0
In the United States, two States, California and Louisiana,
are controlled in their law by the civil law if not by the Code
Napoleon itself. In California the subject is governed by Sec-
tion 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in the Louisiana
Code it is regulated by Sections 936-939. In substance these
' Strauch, Diss. iith 24.Article 720.
'Article 721.
"0 Article 722.
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codes adopt the principles of the Code Napoleon as to survixor-
ship.
We can illustrate the working of these codes by reviewing
two cases very briefly. In Hollister v. Cordero," the husband
and wife were murdered and their house in which their bodies
were left, was set on fire and burned. There was no proof as to
which died first. Both were over fifteen and under sixty years
of age and the Court applying the Code of Civil Procedure, Sec-
tion 1963, presumed that the male survived and added that mur-
der perpetrated thus was as much a calamity within the code as
shipwreck or battle. It would seem that in such a case it might
be presumed with equal probability that the murderer would first
slay the male, the more formidable antagonist of the two, just
as the French courts held concerning the Massacre of St. Bar-
tholomew, when they decided that it would be presumed that the
parents would be slain before minor children because they were
more dangerous to the slayers.
The other case 12 shows the rule as applied in Louisiaa. On
July 4, 1889, the French steamer La Bourgougne was sunk in
midocean in a collision. Among the passengers were a Mrs.
Langles aged fifty-two, and her daughter aged thirty-five, who
could swim, while her mother could not. Neither was seen to
leave their state-room and there was no facts or circumstances
on which to determine which survived. Applying the presunp-
tions established by the code the Louisiana courts held that Miss
Langles survived her mother.
The common law of England has always refused to in-
dulge in any such guessing as to survivorship and has enforced
the well known rule "He who affirms must prove." The wisdom
of this policy "has been unduly vaunted," says Mr. Justice Goode,
in Supienie Council v. Kacer,1 3 and he suggests that one some-
times feels the need of the repudiated presumptions of the
civilians. The Scotch law, like the English, avoids the "subtle
presumptions of fact which adorn modern codes in imitation of
"76 Cal. 649, 18 Pac. Rep. 855 (1888).
In re Succession of Langlcs, io5 La. 39, 29 So. Rep. 739 (1900).
,Supra, note 3.
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the Roman system," and if satisfactory evidence of survivance
cannot be obtained, neither or no one of the parties is held to have
outlived the others.
14
Before taking up a discussion of the law of England and
United States upon this subject, it will be of interest to note the
rule of law on the subject as we find it established in other coun-
tries. By the Mohammedan law of India, when relations perish
together in a common calamity, it is presumed that they all died
at the same moment of time. The ancient law of Denmark was
to the same effect. In Holland, Prussia and Austria the presump-
tion is that those who die in a common disaster die together and
no one receives or transmits succession. Italy and Spain have
followed the same principles established by the French code.
The principle of the English law that "he who affirms must
prove" is the foundation of the decisions made in England and
the United States. The principle was very clearly stated by the
Lord Chancellor in the case of Underwood v. Wing," when he
said:
"We may guess or imagine or fancy, but the law of Eng-
land requires evidence."
All through the English decisions from the earliest times this
principle has run, like the purple thread in the bank note, and
is the characteristic of all our English and American decisions.
An examination of some of the cases will throw light on the
situation. Let us first consider the English cases.
One of the earliest is Broughton v. Randall,-6 decided at
Trinity Term in the thirty-eighth year of Queen Elizabeth's
reign. The question of survivorship arose in a contest over a
widow's dower and in the marginal note, the principle is stated,
that the wife of the longest liver of two joint tenants shall be
endowed. The facts were briefly that father and son held as
"joint tenants to them and the heirs of the son." They were
both hanged on one cart, but because the son as was deposed by
witnesses survived as appeared by some tokens, viz.-his shak-
"Erskine's Principles, 467.
"54 DeGex M. & G. 633 (1854).
" Croke Eliz. 5o2.
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ing his legs, his feme thereupon demanded dower and upon this
issue nunques seisie dower, this matter was found for the de-
mandant.
In the case of General StanwZi,' 7 General Stanwix with his
wife and daughter were lost at sea. No evidence was produced
of the circumstances attending the loss of the vessel. The case
was compromised at the recommendation of Lord Mansfield, who
said that,
"there was no legal principle upon which he could decide it."
In Mason v. Mason,'8 the testator and his son were lost
while on board ship on a voyage from India to England. All on
board perished. The Master of the Rolls held that the rules of
the civil law had never been in force in England and he could
not see how any presumption could be raised as to survivorship as
between father and son.
In Taylor v. Diplock,'0 husband and wife were lost in a
shipwreck. The court held that as there was no satisfactory evi-
dence as to survivorship, nor any circumstances shown of a de-
cisive character as to the ability of the persons to sustain the
peril to which they were subjected, it must be assumed that they
perished at the same moment.
In Sillock v. Booth,2° the court held that where there was
no special circumstance in evidence from which it might be in-
ferred that one of *two persons dying in the same accident sur-
vived the other, the law would draw a presumption from general
circumstances, such as the comparative health, strength, age and
experience of the parties. This case, however, it is fair to say,
has since been subject to criticism and as will be seen by a review
of the later cases, is not now to be regarded as of the highest
authority.
In Selwyn's Goods,2' where husband and wife were lost at
sea and no circumstances of the disaster were known, showing
any advantage on the part of either, the court said that in the
IT 2 Wm. Black 64o (767).
isi Meriv. 308 (I816).
92 Phillim. 261 (I815).
201 Younge v. Collyer Ch. 121 (1842).
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absence of "clear evidence" it has generally been taken that both
died at the same moment.
In Doe v. Nepean,22 the court held that the fact that one was
alive at a given date must be proved by the person alleging the
fact, adding that while there might arise a presumption of death
from an absence of seven years without being heard from, there
did not arise any presumption as to the date of the death. It
may be said that this case applies rather to the presumption of
death than to the presumption of survivorship. The two pre-
sumptions are very closely related and the same principle runs
through both that the burden is on him who alleges the fact of
life at a given time, to establish it by competent evidence.
In Underwood v. Wing,23 a husband, wife and three children
sailed from England for Australia. The ship was lost off Beachy
Head. The husband, wife and two sons were washed into the sea
by the same wave. The daughter perished later. Sir John
Romilly, the Master of the Rolls, held, citing Mason v. Mason,
Taylor v. Diplock, and other cases, that there was no presump-
tion of survivorship as between husband afid wife.24
One of the most interesting cases in the English reports upon
this subject is Onimaney v. Stilwell.25 Edward Couch, the Mate
of the ship Erebus, sailed in 1845 on the ill fated expedition of
Sir John Franklin to the North Pole. He was known to be liv-
ing on June 30, 1845. His father died in January, 185o. The
will of Edward Couch, who was never heard from after June
30, 1845, left his estate to his father, and the question before the
court upon the distribution of his property was whether Edward
Couch survived his father. The court took testimony to ascer-
tain the facts and among other things received the statement of
Dr. Rae who searched for Franklin's party. Dr. Rae told of
interviewing Eskimos who said that they had seen a party of
13 Hagg. Eccl. 748 (1832).
25 B. & Ad. 86 (1833).
1'9 Beavan, 459 (1854).
"4This case was referred to in Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. C. 182 (186o),
and the doctrine there laid down was followed. In this case the House of
Lords added the statement of the rule that the burden of proof is on the
one asserting the survivorship.
2523 Beavan, 328 (1856).
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forty whites crossing the ice in I85o at a time when wild fowl
were about. It appeared that subsequently the bodies of a num-
ber of Franklin's 'party were discovered frozen to death, and
about them on the ice were the feathers and bones of wild fowl
which had been shot and killed. The body of Couch was not
among those found. From the fact that Couch's body was not
with those found it could be fairly argued with some certainty
that he had been lost prior to their death. Sir John Romilly, the
Master of the Rolls, said:
"I confess I cannot come to any satisfactory conclusion on
the subject. My Chief Clerk is of opinion that the son survived
the father, and has made or was about to make a certificate
accordingly. He relied on the youth and strength of the son. I
cannot see that this conclusion is erroneous. I cannot but ex-
press my extreme inability to come to a satisfactory conclu-
sion, but relying on the chances in favor of the youth and
strength of the son, I see no reason to differ from the conclusion
of the Chief Clerk."
An order was entered accordingly. It is submitted that this
'decision, particularly in view of the fact that the body of Couch
was not among those discovered by Dr. Rae, is absolutely un-
supported by such evidence as is required under the general prin-
ciple of the English law. It is just such a decision as would
be reached by applying the civil law rule, and is a good illus-
tration of how far one may go in guessing at facts where there
is in reality little or no evidence to support a conclusion.
In The Goods of Johnson,20 a question arose as to the pre-
sumption of survivorship as between two persons on a vessel
which sailed from New York for San Francisco February i,
1896. The vessel was never heard from and was supposedly lost
off Falkland Islands. Upon an application for administration,
the English courts gave leave to the petitioner to swear "that
there is no reason to presume that one died before the other."
From these cases we think it may be safely concluded and
stated as the rule of law in England, that where two or more
persons perish in a common calamity, survivorship as between
" 78 L. T. N. S. 85 (897).
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them can only be determined by such clear evidence as will enable
a jury to determine with reasonable certainty, though not with
absolute certainty, that one or the other survived.
In our American courts there are numerous cases in which
the presumption of survivorship has been considered. In some
of the cases the courts have reached their conclusions by consid-
ering facts or circumstances which were of so little moment as
to almost make the result a guess. The general result, however,
of all the decisions is the same as in the English courts, viz.-that
he who affirms survivorship must prove the fact, and in the
absence of such proof or in the absence of facts from which a
jury may with moral conviction find survivorship, the parties will
be presumed to have died at the same time. The cases are too
numerous and the decisions too long to warrant an elaborate
review or many quotations therefrom.
In Coye v. Leach,27 one Keith, his daughter, Caroline E.
Coye, her husband and their only child were on the Pulaski, sail-
ing from Charleston to Baltimore. The Pulaski was lost June 4,
1838, with all on board. The court said:
"These are clearly arbitrary rules, as, in the nature of
things, a week or day less than the respective ages named would
not usually, in any degree, affect the ability of the party to sus-
tain and prolong life in case of exposure by shipwreck. Such
rules being thus arbitrary in their character, to some extent,
would seem to require a legislative sanction; and it may be ex-
pedient and proper to provide, by a legislative act, for cases of
this character and description. But, without such legislation,
we do not feel authorized to adopt any fixed period of age, as
decisive of the question of survivorship of those who perish in
a common disaster, and where no facts or circumstances are
known, that would aid in deciding the point of survivorship. To
a certain extent we might well go, in applying the principle as
to disparity of age. Thus it would be proper and reasonable to
hold that one of middle age, and in the full vigor of life, would
ordinarily survive a mere infant, or child of very tender years;
and the same would be alike true as to such person and the man
well stricken in years.
"We therefore should probably have no difficulty in the
present case, in disposing of the question of the survivorship
of Caroline K. Coye, the granddaughter of Mr. Keith. Her
age and strength were less adapted to sustain her, in the con-
tinuance of the struggle for life, under this peril, than those of
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her mother or her grandfather, and might be so held without
resort to any arbitrary rule as to a precise point of time in the
age of the parties. But when we approach the case of Caroline
E. Coye, and are asked to find that she survived her father,
Mr. Keith, we find, on the one hand, the age of Mrs. Coye to
have been somewhat more favorable to her survivorship, though
far less decisive than in comparison of her case with that of her
infant daughter. But we have the opposing circumstance, that
she was of the weaker sex; and thus one presumption operates
to neutralize the other, and the known facts fail to present a case
of controlling presumption in favor of either. The case stated,
then, stands thus: Sylvanus Keith and his daughter, Mrs. Coye,
perished in the same disaster. No fact is shown giving the
least indication that either party, from the nature of the accident
or the position of the parties, had any advantage over the other
for protracting life. Nothing is shown of their peculiar capa-
bilities arising from personal strength or vigor. Nothing in-
deed is put into the case, to control it in favor of either, besides
age and sex; and these, as already remarked, are not decisive
tests in the present case. In truth, there is nothing in the case
to show that either the father or the daughter survived the
other. The evidence in the case, upon the facts stated by the
parties, fails to show that the estate of Sylvanus Keith ever
vested in Caroline E. Coye, his daughter. To effect this, it was
necessary that she should have survived her father. We do
not feel authorized to say that this fact is satisfactorily estab-
lished. For aught that appears in the present aspect of the
case, they may both have perished together. This being so, and
no arbitrary presumption being authorized by law in such cases,
arising from age or sex, the consequence is, that those who seek
to enforce their rights as heirs at law of Caroline E. Coye,
must fail in establishing their right to a distributive share in the
estate of Sylvanus Keith. As to the granddaughter, Caroline
K. Coye, the evidence of her survivorship is inferior to that of
her mother, and no claim can be sustained through her."
In Moehring v. Mitchell,28 Chancellor Kent held that where
a mother and daughter died in the same disaster and there was
no evidence of survivorship, no presumption could be drawn.
In Smith v. Croom,2 9 the question of survivorship was con-
sidered at some length. The case is an exceedingly long one, but
the bulk both of the statement of the facts and of the opinion is
"8 Metc. 371 (Mass. 1844).
,1 Barbour Ch. 264 (N. Y. 1846).
"7 Florida, 81 (1857).
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taken tip with the question of domicile. Upon the question of
survivorship it appeared that Croom was a consumptive who had
been living in Florida for his health. He, with his wife, two
daughters and one son sailed on a vessel which was lost. It
appeared by the proofs that Croom, his wife, and his younger
daughter was swept overboard at the same time; that his other
daughter and one son survived him and that the son survived the
daughter. The case is chiefly of value in that it decides that if a
common calamity to which the parties are subject, consists of a
succession of events, separated from each other in point of time
and character, which events are likely to produce death, the
degree of exposure to danger or the difference in age, sex, and
physical strength, becomes a matter of evidence for the consid-
eration of a jury. The case is also of value in establishing the
principle that the evidence in such cases need only produce moral
conviction, and need not go so far as to exclude the possibility
that the event was otherwise.
One of the leading cases upon the subject in this country is
that of Newell v. Nichols,3" growing out of the loss of the steamer
Schiller on May 7, 1875, near the English coast. The testatrix
whose will was under consideration had died in 187o leaving to
survive her, her mother, her husband and two minor children.
The mother, husband and children were passengers on the Schiller.
The mother was aged sixty-nine, the husband forty-five, the
daughter ten, and the son seven. There was no evidence of sur-
vivorship as among the four parties. Mr. Chief Justice Church,
discussing the question, said:
"It is not claimed that there is any legal presumption that
the children died at the same time. Indeed it may be conceded
that it is unlikely that they ceased to breathe at precisely the
same instant and as a physical fact it may perhaps be inferred
that they did not, but this does not come up to the standard of
proof. The rule is that the law will indulge in no presumption
on the subject. It will not raise a presumption by balancing
probabilities either that there was a survivor or who it was.
In this respect the common law differs from the civil law.
Under the latter certain rules prevail in respect to age, sex and
physical condition by which survivorship may be determined,
so75 N. Y. 78 (1878).
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but nothing can be more uncertain or unsatisfactory than this
conjectural mode of arriving at a fact which from its nature
must remain uncertain, and often upon the existence of which
the title to large amounts of property depend. In the language
of the Lord Chancellor in Wing v. Underwood,31 'We may guess
or imagine or fancy but the law of England requires evidence.'
There are cases where a strong probability in theory at least
would arise that one person survived another, and perhaps as
strong as that that there was a survivor, and yet the common
law wisely refrains from acting upon it in either case. It is
regarded as a question of fact to be proved, and evidence merely
that two persons perished by such a disaster is not deemed suffi-
cient. If there are other circumstances shown tending to prove
survivorship, the courts will then look at the whole case for the
purpose of determining the question, but if only the fact of death
by a common disaster appears, they will not undertake to solve
it on account of the nature of the question and its inherent un-
certainty. It is not impossible for two persons to die at the
same time, and when exposed to the same peril under like cir-
cumstances it is not as question of probability very unlikely to
happen. At most the difference can only be a few brief seconds.
The scene passes at once beyond the vision of human penetra-
tion and it is as unbecoming as it is idle for judicial tribunals
to speculate or guess whether during the momentary life strug-
gle one or the other may not have ceased to gasp first, especially
when the transmission of property depends upon it, and hence
in the absence of other evidence the fact is assumed to be un-
ascertainable and property rights are disposed of as if death
occurred at the same time. This is done, not because the fact
is proved or that there is any presumption to that effect, but
because there is no evidence and no presumption to the con-
trary. . . . All the common law authorities are substan-
tially the same way and the rule which I think is wise and safe
should be regarded as settled.
3 2
The courts of Kansas have adopted and followed the doc-
trine of Newell v. Nichols, in the case of Russell v. Hallett.3 3
In that case an entire family were drowned while crossing a river.
The only evidence was that of a witness who heard the mother
11 Supra, note 15.
3 There was a decision as to the same effect in Kansas Pacific Railway
Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442 (1874), in which case a train wreck was caused
by the destruction of a bridge on the line of the railway. In Stinde v. Red-
fern, 3 Redfields Surg. Reports, 87 (N. Y. 1877), another case growing out
of the loss of the Schiller, the Surrogate held that there was no presumption
of survivorship.
3323 Kansas, 276 (i88o).
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call, but reached her too late. He could not say that the other
members of the family had not also called for help, nor could he
say that they had been lost at the time he first heard her. The
court refused to find that the jury erred in deciding that all the
parties perished at once.
In Fuller v. Linsee,34 Fuller, who was aged thirty-eight and
accustomed to the sea and to boating, together with his wife, aged
thirty-two and in feeble health, sailed from Calcutta to New
York in 1876. The vessel was last seen where it was likely that
it encountered a cyclone. An insurance policy on Fuller's life pro-
vided that "in case the said assured should die before the decease
of her husband" the amount of the insurance should be payable
to their children. The court refused to consider whether there
was any presumption to be drawn from the fact of the feeble
health of the wife and ruled that she had no interest which was
transmissible, unless she survived, and that her claim could not
be maintained without proof that she had so survived.
In Johnson v. MerriheZU,35 the court pointed out that the rea-
son that all persons who are lost in a common disaster are sup-
posed to have perished at the same moment of time, is not so
much because the fact is presumed by the law to he true, as
because there is an entire absence of proof to the contrary. The
court said:
"Death may be proved by showing facts from which a
reasonable inference would lead to that conclusion; as by prov-
ing that a person sailed in a particular vessel for a particular
voyage, and that neither vessel nor any person on board
had been heard of for a length of time sufficient for informa-
tion to be received from that part of the globe where the
vessel might be driven, or the persons on board of her might
be carried. White v. Afann.30 If death may be inferred from
the facts shown, it logically follows that the time of the death
may be fixed, with more or less certainty, in the same manner.
Watson v. King.37 In the case at bar the vessel commanded by
Aaron W. Nickerson, heavily laden with coal, sailed from
Troon, in the south of Scotland, for Havana-voyage usually
"135 Mass. 468 (1883).
'8o Me. 1I (1888).
26 Me. 361 (1846).
i Starkie Rep. 121 (1815) Eng.
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accomplished in from twenty-five to forty days-in the track of
many sailing vessels and steamers plying between the north of
Europe and America. In the case of shipwreck, it is improb-
able, if not impossible, that the Benjamin Hazeltine, if driven
ashore, should not have been reported in the United States
within six months of her loss. If any on board of her had been
rescued by passing vessels, they would have within that time
sent the intelligence of shipwreck to the home port of the vessel.
The circumstances surrounding the vessel, and the voyage that
she entered upon, may well authorize the inference of her loss,
with all on board, within the six months following the date of
her departure from Scotland, and a jury would be authorized
to find the death of her master and his family prior to Sep-
tember II, i88o. The weight of authority at the present day
seems to have established the doctrine that, where several lives
are lost in the same disaster, there is no presumption from age
or sex that either survived the other; nor is it presumed that all
died at the same moment; but the fact of survivorship, like
every other fact must be proved by the party asserting it."
In Re Ehle's Will,38 Ehle, his son and three grandchildren
were in a house, which was destroyed by fire. All were burned
to death. One person not related to them, escaped from the
house. From his evidence it appeared that the fire began in one
end of the house where Ehle had his room. From the peculiar
circumstances of the case the court held that Ehle died first; that
the fee to the real estate vested in the grandchildren, subject only
to the life estate of their father; that there was no evidence to
show the survivorship of John Ehle and his life estate was extin-
guished and that the whole real estate went to the next of kin of
the children. As to the personal property the court held that the
burden was upon the person claiming survivorship to prove the
fact, and that the fact not being proved as among father and
children, they must all be regarded as if death had occurred at
the same moment of time.
In Cowman v. Rogers3 9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
in a very learned opinion by Mr. Justice McSherry considered
this presumption and held that there was no presumption, saying:
"In the appalling and disastrous flood which made desolate
the Conemaugh Valley in the State of Pennsylvania, on May
*s73 Wis. 445 (i889).
so 73 Md. 4o3 (I89I)-
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31, 1889, Walter E. Hoopes, his wife, Maria R. Hoopes, and
their two children, were swept away and perished.
The only evidence in the record is the testimony of a single
eye-witness, the sole survivor of the nine persons who were in
the dwelling of Mr. Hoopes at the time the flood demolished it.
From that testimony it appears that Mr. and Mrs. Hoopes, their
two children, a sister of Mrs. Hoopes, Mr. Smith, the witness,
his wife and two children, were occupants of a frame house in
the village of Woodvale, near Johnstown; that Mr. and Mrs.
Hoopes and Mr. Smith were in the parlor on the first floor on
the day of the disaster, and that Smith, seeing through the win-
dows the water rising rapidly on the outside, rushed out of the
room, leaving Mr. and Mrs. Hoopes there, and made his way to
the second story, where his wife and children and the children
and sister of Mrs. Hoopes then were; that he hurried all of them
tip the stairway, carrying his infant in his arms, and when they
reached the attic steps. the roof parted and fell, killing the child
he was holding, breaking his own arm, and precipitating all of
them into the water. Every inmate of the house, except the
witness, was lost. . . . Whether Mr. and Mrs. Hoopes
were drowned, or were killed by the falling of the house, and
whether their children were also drowned, or were crushed by
the shattered timbers of the building, no human being can tell.
Whether the wife survived the husband, or the husband the
wife, or whether both expired simultaneously, may be subjects
for speculation and conjecture, but can never be proven or
known. Whether their children survived them, or died before
their parents, is shrouded in equally impenetrable uncertainty.
As observed by the Lord Chancellor, in Underwood v. Wing,
40
'We may guess, or imagine or fancy, but the law of England
requires evilence.' If the parents were drowned, and the chil-
dren were killed by the falling roof, it is possible the former
survived their offspring for a brief but scarcely appreciable
space of time. If, on the other hand, parents and children lost
their lives by the crushing of the building, it is more than prob-
able that all of them perished at once. If we were to draw in-
ferences from the probable duration of life after a person
has been submerged, those inferences would be at best only
speculative, and necessarily uncertain and unsatisfactory; and
in regard to the husband and wife, who, when last seen alive,
were both in the parlor of their home, there is not the faintest
shadow of a fact upon which to base even a conjecture as to sur-
vivorship."
The court therefore held that the insurance in the Order of
the Golden Chain, the title to which was in controversy in the liti-
" Supra, note 15.
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gation must be paid to her representative as she was the selected
beneficiary unless the persons who affirmed that she did not sur-
vive proved the fact. The case reviews both the English and
American decisions in Judge McSherry's unusually lucid style.
In Re Willbor,4 ' three maiden sisters lost their lives in the
same disaster. They had made wills by which each had desig-
nated the others as beneficiaries in the event of their surviving
the testatrix. No fact or circumstance appeared from which it
could be inferred that either survived the others. The court held
that the question of survivorship must be regarded as unascer-
tainable and that the rights of succession to their estates must be
determined as if death had occurred to all at the same instant of
time. As a result the bequest in each will to the survivors was in
effect cancelled.
The doctrine of In re Willbor was adopted by the courts of
Texas in the case of Males v. Sovereign Camp.42 In that case
Oliver Males and his wife with their two children lost their lives
in the great storn on Galveston Island, September 8, ioo. The
court said:
"Beyond the fact that the entire family perished in the
storm nothing was proven upon the trial in the court below
about their deaths. No evidence was introduced and none was
attainable as to which one if any of said family survived the
others. There being no proof actual or attainable as to which
one or ones of the family named first died, nor that their deaths
were simultaneous, we appreciate the force and apparent wis-
dom of the civil law, which in such cases indulged presumptions
based on the circumstances of age and sex which ordinarily
best indicate power to prolong life in any great catastrophe, but
without entering into the merits of the different rules, ...
it seems settled with us that we cannot consider the circum-
stances of age and sex as any evidence of priority in the death
of Oliver M. Males, his wife or children."
No proof having been offered by the administrator of Helen
M. Males that she survived, her estate was not allowed to par-
ticipate in the fund.
"12o R. I. 126; 5I L. R. A. 863 (1897).
3o Texas Civil Appeals, 184 (I9O2).
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In Hildebrandt v. Ames, 43 another case growing out of the
Galveston flood, it appeared that the insured and his wife, the
beneficiary of his insurance, were both lost in the flood. The
insurance was to "Minnie Doll, wife of Frank Doll, if living, if
not living to the insured's executors, administrators or assigns."
The contest was between the administrator of the husband and
the administrator of the wife. The facts proven were that Doll
and his wife lived in the western part of the City of Galveston.
About one o'clock on September 8, 19oo, Doll left a grocery store
in a wagon going to that part of the city saying he was going to
get his wife. The horse and wagon were never seen after the
storm. About four o'clock the wagon was seen coming north to
the city proper. The horse was belly deep in water, but no one
was seen in the wagon. The house in which the wife was, was
not destroyed until 7.30 P. M. From these facts there might
possibly have been drawn an inference of the wife's survivorship
had the court been disposed to guess, but it refused to do so,
saying:
"This is all of the evidence in the case, and we think it is
insufficient to raise the issue of the survivorship of either Frank
or Minnie Doll; and until the sea gives up her dead, for aught
that these facts disclose, we may not know whether one sur-
vived the other, or having in life together faced the overpower-
ing fury of the mad waves which engulfed and destroyed the
homes and lives of a great number of the inhabitants of the
fated city of Galveston, they were not divided in death by the
space of even a moment's time. The common law, which is at
once the product and conservator of that rugged independence
and sturdy self-reliance which has ever characterized the Eng-
lish-speaking people, disdaining to borrow from the more
ancient Code of Rome, which has formed the foundation of the
system of jurisprudence of many of the most enlightened na-
tions of the world, refused to indulge in any presumption either
of survivorship or of the simultaneous death of persons who
perish in a common disaster, and applied to this class of cases
the general rule that courts will not change the existing status
or possession of property except upon adequate proof of facts
authorizing such change."
In Broom v. Duncan,44 a husband and wife went into a tim-
4327 Texas Civil Appeals, 377 (190).
0 29 So. Rep. 394 (Miss. i901).
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ber between ii and 12 o'clock, the husband carrying a rifle.
Shortly thereafter two shots were heard. About 6 P. M. the
bodies were found, the husband squatting with the rifle across
his knee and the top of his head blown off. The body of the
wife was still warm, and grass and leaves were in her hands as
if she had struggled when dying. Both bodies were cold by 8
P. M. Upon these facts the court held that there was sufficient
evidence to show that the wife had survived her husband and
that the property had descended to her.
45
In Missouri the same question has been considered and
decided in like manner in United States Casualty Company v.
Kacer,40 where the court referring to the decision In Re Will-
bor,47 says:
"A mass of ingenious reasoning clusters about the question,
what presumption of survivorship exists when several persons
perish in a common accident? The common sense of English
law, after some slight attempts to adopt them, discards the in-
tricate presumptions of the civil law, as based on age, health,
sex, etc., and adopts the rule that there is no presumption on the
subject whatever; that he who relies on the fact of survivorship
must establish it as best he can."
It will be noticed that in this case the court refers with praise
to the common sense of the English law for discarding the in-
tricate presumptions of the civil law, but the same court in the
case of the Royal Arcanum v. Kacer,4 in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Goode, says:
"The wisdom of the common law in never indulging a pre-
sumption as to which of several persons who perished in the
same disaster survived longest has been unduly vaunted; for
the civil law has recourse to that means of settling disputes
concerning ownership of property only in instances where there
is no proof, and then it becomes absolutely necessary to deter-
mine the ownership by some rule more or less arbitrary. The
presumptions of those continental codes which follow the Roman
law are more apt to hit the truth than others, because they are
"To the same effect is the case of Cooke v. Caswell, 81 Texas, 678
(i89i), and Middeke v. Balder, 198 Ill. 59o (19o2).
" 69 Mo. 301 (1902).
"Supra, note; and I Taylor's Evidence, 183.
"Supra, note 3.
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based on attributes of age and sex which fix the average
strength of individuals, and their ability to prolong their lives
in shipwrecks or other disasters in which strength may be use-
ful in the struggle to live. XVhile the common law explicitly re-
jects all presumptions and insists on proof in every case, it im-
plicitly accepts one; for the rule by which the right to property
is ascertained in controversies growing out of such casualties,
namely, that the property shall be disposed of as though all
the deceased persons through whom the litigants claim died at
the same instant, unless there is proof to show otherwise, has
all the consequences of a presumption of simultaneous death.
The logical result of discarding presumptions and exacting evi-
dence is to put the burden of proving survivorship on any party
claiming to derive title to property from a deceased person
whose ownership during life depended on his outliving some
other person also deceased, and the practical result is that if
the party on whom the burden of proof rests cannot make proof
his case falls."
From a review of these cases it will therefore be seen that
the presumption of survivorship has been considered in nearly all
of the important states of the United States, with the possible
exception of Pennsylvania, which curiously enough has not con-
sidered it at all, and that the same general rule prevails in all and
applies whether, the calamity referred to be death by murder, or
in battle, fire, shipwreck or flood. In every instance where there
are not to be found facts upon which a jury may with moral con-
viction find the fact of survivorship, the law will assume that all
(lied at the same instant of time and distribute the estate accord-
ingly. This was the result reached by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of the Young Women's Christian Home
v. French,4 9 in which the authorities are fully reviewed.
Let me close my article as I began it, with the statement that
there is no presumption of survivorship in common disaster, and
each case must be decided upon its own peculiar facts and circum-
stances.
Francis Chapman.
Law School, Temple University.
"187 U. S. 401 (1902).
